Abstract
A quick check of online resources, both recently, and at the beginning of this century, has shown that the classification of moral systems presented below, is, for all intents and purposes, practically absent; or, when present, found under misleading titles such as Probabilism. An understanding of these systems can help form consciences, guide conduct, help comprehend others, and perhaps serve as a valuable tool in the analysis of the behaviour of certain key figures of history.
While this work makes constant reference to law, it must be remembered that what is under discussion is not legality as such, but what moral behaviour is. The application of a particular system cannot be used while arguing a case in front of a judge, it can only be employed to assuage one’s frame of mind – as a variant of mental reservation, as it were. Any of these rules for deciding actions are never valid for extreme positions.
Contents
Scope of this Presentation
The core material herein is taken from certain texts of Moral Theology, where Systems of Moral Theology is sometimes found as an alternate title. [1] Those books were, or are, destined either for the training of clerics, or, since the Twentieth Century, for that portion of the laity of the Catholic Church interested in such matters.
Nevertheless, as the major part of the classification is independent of confessional, and even religious considerations, the value of the approved moral systems is universal, and perhaps can be seamlessly integrated to a person’s pre-existing ethics – hopefully ever conforming to the dictum, “Nolite iudicare et non iudicabimini“- “Judge not, lest you yourselves be judged”. When law is referred to, it is valid to consider both moral law, such as the Decalogue, and Positive Law. An attempt has been made to show both how some groups or individuals managed their moral doubts, and how some libertarian tenets can be justified by tradition. Following a moral code, or one’s conscience, is obedience to what that code, or conscience, dictates. It requires prudence, however; for the improperly formed conscience, incapable of critical reasoning or leaps toward courage, holds obedience to be an absolute value. A brief consideration of game theory in the context of morality is also given.[2]
Problems Under Consideration: Group Dynamics .
Before man ever heard of religion, and for ever after, some moral decisions were the result of pressure exercised by a member of his group, for example, in the Biblical account, Adam claimed his moral behaviour to have been defined by Eve, who in turn, justified herself by blaming the Tempter, Satan.
A number of ideas can be deduced from the following quote:
To say that all systems of morality spring out of social intercourse may, indeed, be going too far, but not so much ‘too far’ as might first appear. Systems of morality involve both positively and negatively, and the obligation to do this kind of thing, and refrain from doing other particular kinds of things. The first element, the having of rules at all, springs from the necessity of persistent social intercourse. The second element, what the rules shall be, springs partly from social intercourse, and partly from reflection. [3]
Two people are sufficient, justifying the reference to Adam and Eve: ” … if you consider two people who belong to any culture … meeting for the first time, it is perfectly true that they will be equipped already with expectations of each other..” [4] People may belong to different groups, such as their family, their work colleagues, their neighborhood, P.T.A., professional organisations, and clubs. [5] An important concept is that “It is, in fact, in the primary group [where everyone knows each other – P.K.M.] that the general standards are learnt, practised, and reinforced, but in addition pressure is brought to conform to the special standards which characterise the particular group in which a person may be.” [6] Unfortunately – and here is where moral valour is truly required – “The extreme forms of social control are ostracism, expulsion, and, in certain cases, death.” [7] What has been stated above is applicable to all groups, secular or religious. When membership in a group becomes a problem to one’s conscience, should the person involved not be able to arrive at amodus vivendi, profit may be derived from either delving into a study of moral systems, or just leaving the group which one’s conscience is rebelling against. If that is not so easy, study, or prudent advice, remains the only option for deciding how to react to the nettlesome issue of staying in, or away from, a certain grouping.
Problems Under Consideration: Biblical Examples .
The story is told of two women, arguing in front of a judge – King Solomon – about the ownership of a dead and live child, each mother claiming the living babe for herself. Believers will have no doubt that his wise decision was a consequence of following the dictates of God. For the benefit of a wider audience, let it be assumed that the decision had to be made on the basis of purely human knowledge. Solomon could have dismissed the case, citing lack of precedent. He could have made any decision at all, based on royal prerogative. He might have, as in some countries, opened a file, accumulated reams of documentation, and hoped that time would solve the problem. What was wanted, though, and what redounds to his glory, was his instantaneous decision, showing a keen insight into human nature. [8]
It would seem that even some kings felt themselves bound by their own laws. In the Book of Esther, the ruler Ahasuerus had made a decree in favour of his chief minister, Haman, and against the Jewish people. However, he had made a promise to Esther that she could have anything she wanted, up to half of his kingdom. She desired that her people be saved. What could the king do, without violating the law, which, once he had affixed his seal thereupon, was binding?
The reader, it is hoped, will never be confronted with such difficult choices. No royal prerogative shall be available. Were that, however, to be the case, it would fall into the system of rigorism.
Obligatory Exclusions
National Socialism was in reality a peak of the moral and spiritual crisis of modern humanity. A vulgar Darwinism prevails, bewilders and befuddles the brain. It was in the name of decadence that the German spirit condemned humanism. Nietzsche preached not inhumanity but super-humanity; all that remained was the selection of physical specimens who would become the new aristocracy of masters. So the modern barbarian arose. Superior by his intelligence and his wilful [sic] energy, freed of all conventional ethics, he could enforce upon the masses obedience and loyalty … [9]
This article eschews consideration of those philosophies such as “if it feels good, do it”, and other utilitarian ethics; and the Nazi spawn of Nietzschean “Beyond Good and Evil”, – the “might makes right” schools of thought. Those who intentionally hold such positions have the capacity to make instantaneous decisions, but they would more often than not be of no usefulness to anyone other than the “decider”. In this wise, neither does this article pretend to view the moral systems as creations of class. [10] Moreover, a number of examples which would no doubt draw a wider, less critical audience, have been ignored deliberately, as the preference is to keep this web page open to the general public, and to avoid complaints that it may contain material not suitable for all age groups. The Freudian concept of the superego, insofar as it concerns a moral conscience, deals with something formed during childhood, and thereafter something to be treated by counselling when problems arise, ergo, it does not fall under the present article’s scope. Furthermore, except for some examples showing authority overstepping its bounds by asking for the immoral, the impossible, and in a few cases, the ridiculous; it should not be understood that a position against authority is held per se.[11]
As this article holds that one is free to decide on which course of action to take, (within prudent limits), it cannot countenance consideration of determinism (whether mechanical, physiological, psychological, theological, or other.) [12] In order to give a certain relevance to individuals who might nevertheless be determinists, reference to God has been avoided as much as possible, but believers can make use of appropriate works in the bibliography. Members of this latter group, whatever their religion, would probably agree with Augustine of Hippo’s dictum:
Ama et fac quod vis.
This would be understood in some religions as:
Diliges Dominum Deum et facies quod vis.[13]
and by others as:
Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota mente tua et ex tota virtute tua et diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum et facies quod vis.[14]
The validity of the above declarations, correctly understood, is not here gainsaid, but they have been abused, and thus can easily lead the way to a looser form of morality. This being the case, the present author has decided to acknowledge these concepts, but to leave them in the original Latin, and to adapt as required.
Essential Preamble: Synderesis and Human Acts
Synderesis
The true nature of synderesis or synteresis,[15] is relevant to discussions on conscience, but need not concern the practically-minded reader, who needs not be told that which is at the heart of the philosophical-theological concept: Do good, and avoid evil. It is mentioned here in the interests of thoroughness, and to guide those who may wish to pursue the synderesis-conscience dichotomy more closely.[16] It might be suggested that Adam and Eve originally operated on this level: Do [eat of all the] good [trees], and [strictly] avoid [the] evil [of eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.][17]
Any ethical system worthy of its name takes into account, before anything else, whether potential, executed, or on-going acts are within the scope of intelligent reflection, i.e., it would hardly be wise to blame a baby for having swallowed a life-threatening object, or to blame a toddler for accidentally drowning the baby in the bath.[18]
Definition of Human Acts
“Human acts, correctly speaking, are all those, and only those, which proceed from man’s deliberate will. Deliberate, that is, being aware, and knowing what one is doing, and furthermore, wanting to carry out the action with a determination that is free [of all coercion].
“Acts of man are those which proceed from oneself, either without awareness, will, or both of these, for example, the acts of one during sleep, or delirium, and the actions of the distracted, the mad, or the drunk, etc.
“Only human acts, not acts of man, are worthy or unworthy, one … is only responsible for the former.” [19]
Brief Classification and Imputability of Human Acts
Human acts may be internal (of the soul) or external (of the bodily organs); and elicited (proceeding immediately from the will, performed by it alone, beginning with this series: wish, intention, fruition, choice (of various means to an end), consent, use, or execution (application of the chosen means to obtaining the end. Commanded acts are those executed by other faculties than the will. [20]
Acts may be natural or supernatural; good (conforming to the rules of morality), bad, or indifferent. They may be valid or invalid.
Acts can be voluntary, and that in various ways: perfectly, with full knowledge and deliberation, otherwise imperfectly; simply or absolutely, as distinguished from voluntary under a certain respect (Latin: secundum quid).[21] An act may be willed under a certain circumstance only, for example, in the days of sail, a merchant might be willing to sacrifice his goods on a ship during the storm, to save the ship and his life.[22]
The act can be voluntary in itself, and by itself an object of the will. If it is the effect of something else willed, it is called voluntary in something else, or voluntary in the cause. These are also called directly and indirectly voluntary actions. For a positive inclination to exist, evil effects must be foreseen, the agent must be able to prevent the evil effect, and there must be an obligation not to perform the action by reason of the evil effect which would follow. [23] (See examples under Compensationism: Principle of the Double Effect).
An unjustified act, even if not gravely wrong, but which causes grave harm, is imputable to its agent. [24] Some of the imputable human acts, will, under certain circumstances, give rise to moral hazard (see further below). Hence, it may be said that any act which creates a potential moral hazard is imputable.
Diminished Voluntarism
Ignorance, let alone nescience, (distinguished by an excusable lack of knowledge, as compared to the former, which herein deals with knowledge that should be had), excuses from fault when it is invincible. Vincible ignorance may be fostered, when little or no effort is made to overcome it. It may be crass or supine; insufficient for the case, simply vincible ignorance. It may be about law, fact, or penalty. If it is antecedent to an act, it is not voluntary, if concomitant; it is not expressly willed; and it may be consequent to the act. Modern authors want to know the reason for the ignorance,e.g. if there was fear.[25]
Concupiscence, when antecedent, is not voluntary. It may be consequent. [26]
Fear may be grave or slight, absolutely grave, for example, in cases dealing with death or life imprisonment, relatively grave in the case of a timid person. It may be reverential, from without, or from within (an example of the latter, fear of death from a disease which one has caught.) Actions taking place under fear may be simply voluntary, or involuntary under a certain respect (secundum quid). Grave fear ordinarily excuses, except where great harm may come to the common good, hence the military draftee is not exempted.[27]
Violence or duress affects the will. If resistance to violence is only partial, it is said that there is violence under a certain respect. [28]
The complexity of what has been said above can be seen below in what seems to be an argument either for or against leniency towards convicts’ using diminished voluntarism as a defense, the following truncated citation may be considered:
It is part of the folklore of prisons that prisoners never take responsibility for the crime that sent them to jail. Quite to opposite is true of most inmates. … Most [prisoners] believe that taking total responsibility is better than total powerlessness. … “I knew right from wrong,” [a prisoner] said. “That wasn’t my problem. My problem was that I couldn’t administer myself in stressful situations. … if I don’t control myself, someone will control me.” [29]
The Classification of the Moral Systems
Before presenting the moral systems, which have been hinted at in previous paragraphs, some indication of possibly competing ethical systems seems to be in order. These are not gone into in any depth, because others, in the fields of philosophy and sociology – as the case may be – have already provided this service. In the first place, deontology , teleology or consequentialism (including utilitarianism) , and virtue ethics must be mentioned. Superficial understanding may cause confusion on the differences, and they may be furthermore coloured by bias, but it is hoped that it may safely be said that the first two of these are norms: deontics tells one to do his duty, consequentialism asks one to consider the effect of an action,i.e., in simple terms, these two systems are a fight of ends justifying the means versus means justifying the end. (Another classification, given for high school students, is linked within these parentheses.) The present author holds that the correct system, in terms of the aforementioned categories, is too much based on definition – were he to expect that the reader must follow one of the systems recommended below, that reader will have done his duty. Were he to argue that consequences must be considered, the dutiful individual might well say that his happiness is precisely in carrying out the letter of the law, and at least not being punished for it. One source suggest that the system of Thomas Aquinas is virtue ethics, without necessarily contradicting, another suggests a rather utilitarian bent.[30] It may be safe to say, that as long as these systems safely integrate with the non-extremist positions listed below, from a practical (as opposed to erudite) point of view, the differences in the systems need not be further discussed.
One old book gives such a novel list of systems – which it finds censurable – and which might otherwise be overlooked – that mention of those systems does seem to be in order. [31] An exception is therefore being made to the reluctance to mention these somewhat modernistic schools of thought – at least one of them may have some merit. First-mentioned is Kant, with his categorical imperative, a deontological concept. Second is Élie Metchnikoff, who invented the word ” orthobiosis ” –i.e., correct living – hygienically and morally. Some of his ideas are found in the chapter “Science and Morality” of his work, The Prolongation of Life; Optimistic Studies. García D. Figar calls Metchnikoff’s ideas “biological morals”.[32] Then three sociologists are mentioned: the first of these is not as well-known as the others: Alfred Fouillëe, who wrote the work, Morale des idées-forces. “It is sufficient to extract the idea of goodness from ourselves, and then to elevate it above all other ideas”.[33] García objects in that goodness is something that he sees as synonymous with will, which, according to Fouillée, is not free. Next to last is the “system” of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, writer of Ethics and Moral Science. In truth, titling a chapter, Theoretical Ethics Has Not and Cannot Have any Practical Existence, while open to interpretation, does look shocking to someone looking for guidance. García specifically attacks La morale et la science des meures [sic, for mœurs]. As described, it would be a type of situation ethics which is being condemned, in that morals are seen as the product of varieties of reasoning, affected by eras and climates.[34] The final rant is saved for Émile Durkheim, author of Moral Education, and denounced as the creator of sociological morality.[35]
Prescinding from the above Biblical and Augustinian quick rules of thumb, and jumping over Thomas Aquinas’s contributions – which at any rate, influenced what came thereafter, the following is a hybrid classification of the moral systems, from most to least severe. Items used in traditional books of theology are in bold blue text, variants in ordinary blue, and modern additions in red. A graph has been made on the basis of these ten systems, where each system’s validity corresponds to the trigonometrical sine function of the number in the left-hand column, multiplied by ten. The chart attempts to show conformity with the source material (see Image 2.)
The first column above gives the colour of the vertical bands, the second considers this as degrees from 0 to 90, the third gives how many serious theologians would be needed to support the position named in the final column. [36] Apparently, there would exist a difficulty in finding these experts, at least since the time of moral relativism. “The difficulty with probabilism, a difficulty shared by all these moral systems, was that there was no objective criterion for determining whether a given law or moral obligation was probable, more probable or less probable.” [37]
From the point of view of the present author, among contemporary “experts”, rigorism would probably be found in five percent of that population, probabiliorism among another ten to fifteen percent, equiprobabilism among the remainder, as it would have merged into probabilsim, laxism, and moral relativity.
The following chart shows the positions of some theologians, most of whom have been cited in this work. Knowledge of their views is considered essential to determining their credibility, otherwise, the chart may be safely ignored.
Name | Year | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 12 | 13 | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Thomas Aquinas | ca. 1467 | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | OP | High | – |
Cornelius Jansen | ca. 1644 | ? | ? | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | ? | Daring | [38] |
Alphonsus Liguori | 1753 | Y | ? | N.A. | CSSR | High | [39] | ||||||||
N.N. | 1844 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | N | N.A. | Y | N.A. | N.A. | High | [40] | |
Slater | 1925 | Y | ? | Y | Y | N | Y | N | N.A. | Y | N.A. | 5 | SJ | High | |
Vittrant | 1944 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N.A. | Y | N.A. | – | SJ | High | [41] |
Bujanda | 1956 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | N | Y | – | SJ | High | [42] | ||
Conway | 1962 | -. | – | – | – | – | -. | – | – | – | – | – | none | Fair | [43] |
Häring | 1970 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | ? | !!! | Y | !?! | 3 | CSSR | !!! | [44] |
Hortelano | 1971 | Y | Y | !!! | Y | !?! | CSSR | !!! | [45] | ||||||
Royo | 1976 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | 2 | OP | High |
Numbers 1 – 10 correspond to the moral systems in in this article. Number 11 is the source’s view of Liguori, rated 2, 3 or 5, i.e. , as a probabiliorist, equiprobababilist, or probabilist. Column 12 is the religious order, OP: Dominican, S.J.: Jesuit, CSSR: Redemptorist, and Column 13 gives the present writer’s view of the orthodoxy of the work in question. [As it is impossible for the author to arrive at a more elegant solution to the lack of visibility of the 13th column, the information is reprinted here: With the exception of Jansen, whose orthodoxy was given here as “daring”, from Aquinas to Bujanda, all were rated highly orthodox. Conway was rated as fairly orthodox, Royo as highly orthodox, while Häring and Hortelano were, in the opinion of this author, suspect in their positions.] |
Descriptions of the Moral Systems
In general, the first six of these items are used in the following way:
The desired degree of certainty of one of any two courses of actions being the correct one, is calculated, and acted upon; from whence, the first corollary:
I. The desired degree of certainty between the presumption of the obligatory nature of an action or a decision in favour of it being non-binding, i. e.,a choice between action or non-action, is calculated, and acted upon; from whence, the second corollary:
II. In the event that that there is no way of determining whether a required obligation has been fulfilled, the desired degree of certainty between the presumption that it has, or has not been carried out, is calculated, and acted upon. [46] This leads to a third corollary:
III. If it is known that Step I had never been followed in the first place, and one is required to determine whether the required conditions have been met or not in order for a specific act to have beenmoral , the desired degree of certainty is again evaluated, and the determination made. An examination of conscience would be what this is about.
IV. What has been said for acts in IV is equally valid for thoughts, in the event that there should be some concern about “thought crime” or sins. [47]
V. Should there be any doubt about the validity of the appraisal of an action as being ethically correct, that appraisal itself shall be considered as an action, hence, one returns to Step I, and asks oneself about the degree of certainty desired,etc.
The more critical the issue under consideration, the less one should be inclined to use the more liberal methods of resolving the doubt. It is a question of prudence in the theological sense. “It is to be observed that prudence, whilst possessing in some sort an empire over all the moral virtues, itself aims to perfect not the will but the intellect in its practical decisions. Its function is to point out which course of action is to be taken in any round of concrete circumstances. It indicates which, here and now, is the golden mean wherein the essence of all virtue lies.” [48] The following thoughts might be added:
Agir sans avoir réfléchi, c’estse mettre en voyage sans avoir faitde préparatifs. N’entreprenez rien sans y avoir bien réfléchi: mais quand votre résolution est prise, exécutez-la avec vigueur.[49]
It does not seem impossible to link this idea of prudence with courtesy, as rashness violates the requirements of politeness. However, this was “a term of complex meaning which includes most of the virtuesrecognized by medieval aristocratic Christian society … The courteous man is noble, religious, decent, grateful, eloquent, compassionate, humble, grave; he is capable of both love and chastity, frank in attitude but reserved in behaviour and aware of all the delicacies of personal relationship and public demeanour which go to make up the civilized life. … [G]ood manners are a sign of moral goodness.”[50]
Rigorism
If social class were to be considered, this is the system that the rulers would have their subjects follow. It requires that the individual always follow the decision which favors the law. It justifies the person who would claim to be following orders. It is a moral fundamentalism, condemned both in its theological representations such as Jansenism [51] and its military argument used by the Nazis judged at the Nuremberg trials. There is some irony in the rigorist position, in that some clerics who started out in the Roman Catholic Church were condemned rigorously, and are now being viewed more positively. Savonarola himself was somewhat morally severe, and was executed for his views.[52] Martin Luther had followed a personally rigorous line of thinking when he complied with his vow to become a monk if he were saved during a thunderstorm while riding his horse – modern understanding would say his decision was made under duress. Later, he was anathematised, only recently has peace been made between the greater body of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches.[53]
The definition of rigorism does not conform to the standards of this century. Ludovico Hertling, states that “extremism, fanatism, zelotism, rigorism and intolerance almost always originate in a secret weakness for which one wants to compensate … moral rigorism at times is found in those who suffer a secret moral weekness which must be kept hidden.” [54] Rigorism, though, by his understanding, is compatible with a “spare the rod, spoil the child” philosophy towards education: “We must remain completely addicted to tradition and experience: where there is no violence, there is no education, hence, no education will ever exist either…” [55]
An example of the condemnation of rigorism by a rabbi, is a point worthy of mention. [56]
Some theological hair-splitting does occur, as an exclusion is made, needlessly it would seem, in the case that the decision to follow the position contrary to the one in the law is completely certain. [57] This would seem to imply that if it is known that a statute, for example, which is still on the books, has fallen into disuse, it need not be complied with. A further subdivision allows a mitigated rigorism, in that instead of a most certain contrary position to the law, a most probable decision for non-compliance suffices. [58]
Probabiliorism
Probabiliorism is a decision in favor of following the dictates of a law unless the contrary decision is more, rather than most probable, in its licitness. Royo Marín claims this is the best position, the one most praised by the Catholic Church. [59]
Old Wine in New Wineskins: Social Security and Universal Medical Care
Older manuals on morals often discussed the validity of the institution of Old-Age Pensions. One author presents this:
Tesis: En teoría, parece que el Gobierno no tiene derecho para imponer el seguro a los patronos ni a los obreros; en la práctica, nos inclinamos a conceder al Gobierno este derecho. (In theory, it seems that the Government has no right to impose [such an] insurance on either the employer or the employee, but in practice, we are inclined to conced this right to the government.[60]
It can be seen that while the writer inclined to theoretical rights, he chose the “more certain” solution in favour of the law. The argument against the legitimacy of universal health insurance which Barack Obama and other Democrats pushed for, (and won, through a Supreme Court decision) clearly falls into the same rubric. At least opponents have the cold comfort, that the “Obamacare” [The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act] law could be reversed under a president with opinions more in line with their own.
Equiprobabilism
To an impartial mind, equiprobabilism would seem to be the best course to follow. Upon weighing the pros and cons of how to act, should the cons weigh only as much as the factors in following the law, it may be decided to go with one’s own judgement. Another possible way of viewing it is to consider the law no more applicable in a given situation than another law which would have established exactly the opposite course of action. [61]
St. Alphonsus Liguori
Alphonsus [of] Liguori, mentioned in the footnote to the above paragraph, deserves separate mention, for many of the vicissitudes of his own life may be considered as the result of the application of varied moral principles. To start with, until he lost a case, he was a lawyer moving up in the world. Whatever his moral system may have taught, he is said to have firmly handled obstinate wrongdoers, was charged with laxity, opposed Jansenist rigor, and wanted to win back “sinners” by patience and moderation instead of severity and fear. (The apparent contradiction is in the source.) He was tricked into signing a document which split his religious congregation. [62] His opponents, obviously, had different moral systems.
Specific instances in his work, Theologia Moralis, showing the tendency to probabilism, are found in the first volume, where books of this nature tend to set out the fundamentals. Thus, “Antiprobabilistarum Theologicis libris” and the “Jansenianos perditissimi” are two examples which may be cited, the latter, depending upon the choice of translation, being potentially “rigoristic”.[63]
Compensationism
Compensationism, not dealt with in all sources, again requires a fine legal mind, if it is to be used. The law must be followed, but now, if, for a just cause, a precept were to be violated, not by directly wanting to do so, but indirectly, with a less than equal chance of being in the rightjustifying the non-legal course of action. Royo Marín, contradicting his own classification, considers this system closer to probabiliorism than equiprobabilism, and hence “very just, balanced, [and] it can be followed with certainty of conscience.” [64]
Principle of the Double Effect – an Example
Whether religious or not, most people would agree that drunkenness is wrong. From the moral point of view, this may be because it acts against life – through the liver or the brain, or because the effect on the brain may cause harm, whether criminal or moral. Assuming, however, that a person required an emergency surgical procedure, and that no anaesthetic were available, the patient could be rendered oblivious to pain by an intoxicating amount of a strong drink. The intended effect is a good one, meant to avoid pain, and perhaps further injury, during the operation. An undesired negative effect may result later, cursing, defamatory statements, revelation of secrets, and even worse vile deeds, but this is clearly undesired by the parties involved. This would seem to be an example of compensationism. [65] (Further below, this has been put into chart form, and considered using game theory).
An example which might be of interest to the libertarian school of thought is the following: “If the evil effect follows merely by accident, it does not render an otherwise lawful action unlawful, and I am not bound to abstain from it on account of the mere possibility of the evil effect following from it. Thus, if a hundred people indulge in hunting or motoring for a considerable time, some one of them is morally certain to meet with an accident endangering life or limb. But this does not make hunting or motoring morally wrong. … it is presumed that I use reasonable care to avoid mishap.” [66]
Principle of the Double Effect – Valid Application
When an action produces two effects, one good, the other not, that action may be performed under the following conditions: 1) it is not bad in itself (it may be indifferent); 2) the agent does not intend the bad, only the good; 3) the good effect is not produced as a result of the bad one; and 4) there must be sufficient grounds for permitting the evil effect. [67] Hence, motoring, hunting, and the bearing of arms definitely fulfil the first three conditions, and how the fourth is complied with, is understood easily enough.
Probabilism
Probabilism is a system that allows going against a law, as long as any probability exists of the contrary position being a solid and valid one. It is easy to understand, as no shades of grey are involved. The more intelligent cases of creative accounting could be examples of probabilism, or, better yet, certain decisions with respect to tax laws.
The German theologian Bernhard Häring writes rather positively of the system, lumping equiprobabilism in this category, and even a lesser probabilism (Spanish: minuprobabilismo). He gives an unreferenced quotation, “He who works with probability works with prudence.” [El que obra con probabilidad obra con prudencia.][68] The Spanish theologian, Royo Marín, on the other hand, while acknowledging that the system has never been condemned, emphasizes that it has never been approved.[69] It has the following limitation: it must be loyally followed in any specific case, having availed oneself of this position for the sake of an advantage, such as to obtain an inheritance, it cannot then again be used to shake off a burden obtained once the benefit was obtained, i.e., if it was found that the properties had liens upon them, probabilism could not be justly used to escape that problem.[70]
Laxism
In modern terminology, laxism is following the principles of “if it feels good, do it”, or “doing one’s own thing”. It is the anarchy diametrically opposed to authoritarianism. In religion, it is the belief that God condemns no one, whatever one does, in the end, one is saved. Strictly speaking, a probability, however slight it may be, is required. As a practical example, the dubious “creative accounting” techniques come to mind. Laxism was condemned by Pope Innocent XI in 1679. [71] Even Friedrich Engels thunders against it. [72]
An Example of Laxism
While examples of laxism would hardly seem necessary, this author feels that within institutions, whether religious or other, they infiltrate insidiously. An example is here taken from the Roman Catholic best-selling author, Morris West, writing with Robert Francis. First, authority is diminished by the argument wielded by Leo the Great, “He who is to rule, must be chosen by all.” [73] The potential for abuse by this broad statement is clear both in the civil and religious field.
The authors do address a legitimate complaint, but his main argument, – in favour of divorce – nowadays obviously a problem only for certain religious people, is flawed within the religious context. “Our sanest counsellor on this book”, regarding marriage states that “is a cruelty beyond description.” The authors reply, “But the law exists and is enforced,”to which comes the solution, “Then it may, in good conscience, be broken or avoided.”[74] First, the counsellor is not named, and second, the word “sanest” is value-laden – to the superlative degree. The entire argument is shorter than any paragraph written here, hence, is not a reasoned way to form opinion.
Situation Ethics
Situation Ethics has been defined as “A method of moral analysis which only considers concrete, historical circumstances as relevant factors in moral decision-making and does not acknowledge either the existence, applicability or binding nature of universal norms,” or more simply, by the same author, as “proceed[ing] something like this: Every moral situation is unique and unrepeatable, and the person making a decision is said to encounter God immediately in his own conscience. As long as the moral agent is sincere and believes himself to be acting in good faith, the action which he takes or does not take is judged immaterial.” [75] Some of the world’s most infamous dictators have probably acted “sincerely” – proof enough, without any more words, against such an ethic.
Epikeia
Before all the above systems were formally developed, there existed, in the Thirteenth Century, another way of considering rules, epikeia, sometimes rendered as “equity” in English, and which requires the application of principle of charity (caritas, brotherly love) to mitigate the harshness of the law. It originated with St. Albert the Great, and was further developed by Thomas Aquinas. It is eminently reasonable – as Albert said, “Reality should not adjust itself to the laws, but the laws to reality,” and in general, that there are cases where following the letter of the law is wrong.[76] Reading the original material just cited would suggest situation ethics, and as the unacceptability of that system has already been referred to, this author compromises with the following quotation, which contains an argument in favour of the libertarian position of the carrying of arms:
Epikeiais a benevolent, but just, interpretation of the law, by which it is judged that the law is not taking into consideration a specific situation, because, on the basis of solid reasoning it may be supposed that either the lawmaker did not foresee such a situation, or did not care to take it into account, although it was never contemplated as an exception to the text of the law; thus, for example, if the law prohibited the carrying of arms during the hours of darkness, I may bear them if I had to go out and [possibly] run into my enemy who is looking for me with the intention of murdering me.[77]
Apparently, on rare occasions, even government departments are capable of making decisions in favour of reduced red tape, by advocating benevolent interpretations of statutory criteria. [78]
Be that as it may, dogmatic teachings prohibitepikeiain cases where the law in not meant to be flexible, and it may be well to repeat that the same goes for the application of any of the more acceptable moral systems. Hence, having recourse to a more benign moral system is, in effect, an example of epikeia.
Casuistry
Casuistry is the application of the principles of a moral principle to a particular problem. It is like the case law of jurisprudence – a type of precedent is set, which can be followed in the future. Originally the preserve of clerics, it eventually made its way into the religious press for the laity, wherein it was found as a type of advice column for those who wanted to know about some particular concern. Later, there would be a reaction, as it would be considered too legalistic, and the breeding ground of excessively scrupulous, read neurotic, persons. It is to be wondered whether the real problem might not have been a certain discomfort in answering difficult questions, whether out of delicacy, lack of knowledge, or fear of giving the wrong answer. Hence, allegedly, individuals were given more leeway in moral matters by those who should have been giving guidance. [79] There is some record of Protestant casuistics, though on a lesser scale. More rigoristic rather than the more probabilist Catholic versions, nevertheless it borrowed from the latter, while the Anglicans and the other Protestant churches also exchanged opinions. [80]
Examples of how various systems may have dealt with a problem may exist, but this author has neither seen them, and in the interests of originality, has not attempted to look for them. There are certainly the same hackneyed examples given time and again, but one is never told which moral system is being applied in the case under question. Four cases are presented here. The material is meant to be illustrative, not prescriptive, and it differs from standard casuistry, in that various answers are given for the problem. This may be called “scalar casuistics”, a first step in solving the problem of the static nature of case morality. In Example One, it has been carried out further, by suggesting a planar scale for an extra dimension of consideration. The ideal would be to carry the investigation into multiple dimensions, which, it has often been suggested, is missing in traditional texts, because the latter do not conform with the modern postulate that all factors must be considered – an impracticality for short, timely answers to a problem.
Four Illustrations of the Application of These Moral Systems
Example One: Dress Code for Women Claiming Western Religious Values
What is proper dress for women is becoming an exceedingly controversial topic in some countries, especially due to the influx of Moslems into European countries. Rabid reactions are often heard about the clothing worn even in the 1950s . Especially from a religious, moral point of view, one expects modesty, and, allowing for variation of styles, this is seen especially in the cases o f Islam , Hinduism , Orthodox Judaism , and the more conservative Christians, such as the Amish . Certain countries where contemporary styles have not yet come into vogue might also be mentioned, such as Bolivia . It may be seen that women wore basically the same type of dress at least up to around the beginning of the Twentieth Century , with the body well covered, skirts originally reaching the ground, followed by sixty more years of hemlines below the knee. Exceptions were found among the nobility, who had time and money for fashionable innovation, but not for the mass of peasantry and industrial workers. It does not go into a discussion of what modesty actually is, that would be a question apart.
The full-sized image is at this link: <here>.
Rigorism: Only face, neck, and hands may be exposed.
Mitigated Rigorism: The hair might be left uncovered
Probabiliorism: The neckline of a dress could be cut to a depth of two fingers belowthe hollow of the neck, as dressed from the time of the Renaissance to the beginning of the 20th Century.
Equiprobabilism: Ankle, and the lower arm might be shown,and a lower, but norevealing neckline could be used.
Compensationism: Half of lower legs, and partially bare back, could be shown.
Probabilism: (used strictly, excluding previous two items, and the next).: Knees,bare arms, and slightest cleavage possible.
Minusprobabilismus (Latin term used): Dress may be a bit above the knees, with a lowback, and a clear bit of cleavage.
Laxism: Miniskirt of the 1960s, bare midriff.
Moral Relativism: Less than above.
The footnotes for the above indicate would indicate, (using the above as descriptive of women’s wear), that Western society has fallen into laxism and moral relativism with regards to modest dress. The following notes show the gap between practice and guidelines in the Roman Catholic community.
Note One: Dress Code at the Vatican: The Vatican supposedly has a strict dress code, but is not quite explicit enough to allow correct classification. The rules (interpreted from various web sites) are that there be no low neckline, no skirt above the knee, and no bare shoulders, and the upper half of the arm covered. By the scale suggested here, it is stricter than probabilism, but considering that this is considered a religious site, it may be concluded that outside of the domains of this city-state, probabilism or minusprobabilismus would be acceptable.
Note Two: Some Catholic schools in the Canadian province of Ontario have recently given up trying to enforce that girls wear skirts not above the knees. The solution is to have them wear slacks. Hasidic Jewry prescribes similar, perhaps slightly more rigorous dress. Whether slacks or pants may be worn is a separate question.
Note Three: The description given under probabiliorism was that prescribed by Pope Pius XII in 1956.[81]
The example above has limited its consideration to how much of the human body may be exposed. The analysis is completely linear. Let another dimension be added, that of an appreciation of the human body. This is more difficult, because the definition of rigorism depends on one’s being rigorously deistic, or totally secular, but let it be supposed that rigorism springs from the problems of Adam and Eve with the Serpent.
Rigorism: The human body is something to be ashamed of, this is why it was covered after the Fall.
Probabiliorism: The human body is something to be ashamed of, as regards showing it off in public.
Equiprobabilism: The human body, when in good health, and for the purposes of attracting a spouse, or to show athletic prowess, may be revealed in such a way that neither the exhibitor or the person[s] viewing it are led to discomfort, as they do understand that the body seen under other circumstances would be shameful.
Compensationism: Sportswear such as shorts and T-shirts may be used by all and sundry, whatever the physical condition, even during non-athletic occasions, outside of institutions (places of worship, schools, public buildings, offices of professionals, etc). Anything else would be discrimination.
Probabilism: Should the climate so permit, most of the body may be revealed in the flesh, and all of it when covered in form-fitting material.
Laxism: There should be no shame about the body at all. Practical considerations might require some covering up, it is obvious that certain dignitaries could not be visited otherwise. The body was made beautiful, whether by God, or Natural Selection.
Example Two: Clothing of Moslem Women
This example will consider how the dress code of Moslem women could be classified: With the exception of rigorism, it is shown that the clothing usually does not much differ from what the prescribed dress in the Christian world would be, (if it were to be used), rigorism being excluded. It should be noted that the prevailing dress code is for use in public, the West mistakenly seems to think that this is the way the women are permanently raimented. Furthermore, there are regional variations, – obviously, it must not be supposed that such a scale of options exists in regions with strict sharia law.
Rigorism: No part of the body is visible, head to toe covering, Few countries actually follow this code. This is the burqa of Afghanistan.
Mitigated Rigorism: The burqa contains a small rectangular opening for the eyes.
Probabiliorism: Eyes may be seen. This is the chador (chadur), the most common formof dress.
Equiprobabilism: Body is totally covered, head is veiled. May be common in ruralareas of secular Moslem states.
Conpensationism: Hair is visible, though the veil is worn. This apparently happens in Iran
Probabilism: Veil is not used. A prohibition against wearing the veil has recentlybeen a cause for debate in Egypt. Veils are not allowed in public buildings in Turkey.
Minusprobabilismus: Modest western dress, at least as described in compensationismin Example One. This is probably used by Moslem women in Europe who are in trying to appeal both to tradition and modernity.
Laxism: Under European influence, this would be the standard form of of Western-style dress used by nominally Moslem women, who would argue that at the time of the Prophet, the dresscode now in effect did not exist.[82]
Example Three : Personal Protection Against Aggression
This example will consider self-defence, assuming no use of weapons. The War on Terror, and anti-gun law advocates and opponents all provide grist for the mill. The ideas presented below would have to be suitably tailored for law enforcement or military use, but existing casuistry already gives some guidelines.
Rigorism: No self-defence may be exercised, the law will probably protect the attacker as a member of an underprivileged group, and from a moral point of view, it isexpected that one turns the other cheek.
Probabiliorism: Defence is purely passive, as with Jiu-jitsu– the gentle method. The attacker is to be worn out by the possible dexterity of the defender. Should, however, the attacker hurt himself through no fault of the defender, the latter would not be guilty.
Equiprobabilism: The attacked individual is entitled to use “proportionate force”, which in this case must not cause physical harm.
Compensationism: The defender may cause sufficient pain, but no harm, in order to ensure the temporary incapacitation of the attacker. The attacker would then be invited to desist.
Probabilism: The defender may use all necessary force to incapacitate the attacker,excluding death and grievous (permanent) bodily harm. The aggressor should realize that continuing the struggle is not in his interest.
Laxism: Violence at the boxing ring level, the attacker may be downed so as to deprive him of the will to get up for a few minutes.
The above examples, then, show that a scalar presentation is possible in at least some cases of moral doubt (assuming that it existed in the first place). The last example can help one understand that friends of law-and-order will take exception to criticism of the level of violence used to quell unruly individuals; conversely, it could aid in comprehending why those preferring live-and-let-live are for rigorous non-violence on the part of those whose job it is to protect society. The fourth, an illustrated example, follows the next section, which should be read first.
Group Dynamics Again: Moral Hazard andGame Theory
The mention of the sport of boxing, and consideration of the various outcomes in deciding an issue such as the amount of violence permitted for self-defence now leads to a brief consideration of game theory in morality. [83] As two different ideas are being integrated here, let the rather technical term “moral hazard” be defined first. It is the risk an insurer takes, because the very fact of insuring someone creates a greater demand for the paying out of indemnities than would theoretically happen without the existence of that insurance, as without it, the prospective policy-holder would behave more carefully. [84] If God of monotheism were no more than the gods of the Greek and Roman pantheons, moral hazard would be suffered as a result of free will given to man, who may well scheme to “take Heaven by storm”. This thought occurred to the author in the context of a declaration made many years ago, when an immature parochial school student expressed the idea that he could misbehave, because forgiveness of his transgression was an obligation. It may be seen that the “forgiver” suffers moral hazard. Given the reality of moral hazard, the wise insurer would create strategies minimising his risk, while a wily insured individual may be considering ways of optimising his financial position through an undeserved payment. This is an example of a game in game theory, of which Prisoner’s Dilemma is a common example. [85] The advisable course of action is co-operation, by which here it is not meant that the prisoners cooperate with the jailors – rather, the given example requires the prisoners not to denounce one another – an implicit co-operation between the two suspects. In a reiterative series of such events, it is shown that co-operation is the best strategy when defection is immediately punished. From this, the author concludes that the Old Testament “an eye for an eye”, or “tit for tat”, while not being the most ethical strategy, is the best one can do in an imperfect world. [86] The analysis of moral hazard and Prisoner’s Dilemma both show opportunities for forms of unethical behaviour: in the former, it is the opportunity of committing an unjustified, imputable human act, i.e. insurance fraud, or involuntarily willed, that is, suffering an accident, through insufficient care, yet covered by the insurance. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, the prisoner is being psychologically pressured. The ethics of plea bargaining has been considered in this context. [87] In the language of the past, the correct solution would be to use compensationism.
A Synthesis of Moral Systems, Game Theory, Moral Hazard, Double-Effect, and Information Technology: The Fourth Example: A Surgical Operation
The clerics who thought that religion needed to cast off the moral systems and the casuistry, such as it had developed up to about the beginning of the Twentieth Century, in order to bring their religion up-to-date, could have waited for a different type of
aggiornamento. All that was needed was access to a computer, and a sufficiently large database, containing certain and probable answers to all kinds of questions that might plague serious believers. The new construct might be called, as the diagram below shows, “Casuistry for the Information Technology Age”. (It does not show at the required size, unfortunately.)
The diagram must be considered a gross simplification – it would be possible, for example, to suggest that the question requires an answer for a predetermined moral system, thus speeding up the reading of the answer on the part of the user. For more sophistication, the chart shown above should be amalgamated with the next one.
Again, simplifying, so that the eyes need not wander all over the page, let the case be considered of a surgeon in some out-of-the-way place, importuned by a severely-wounded penniless, alcoholic victim of some misfortune. How does the doctor decide to act? The first of the following diagrams looks at the moral systems involved, assuming that, for example, the doctor had not already given a similar operation to a homeless friend, or anything else of such a nature, which might be construed to show prejudice, if this time no action were taken.
The diagram has simplified the question of probabilism and minusprobabilism, in the interests of economy of space. Note that in the orange-brown area, the question was not worded in the best way so as to generate a “No” answer, because in that case, it should not be necessary to choose “Ready with Reason to accept more risk?” as the following. At that point, if the surgeon has second thoughts, the sequence begins again. The assumption is made that at this point, neither rigorism nor laxism will be chosen, but this is not necessarily true – the diagram needs to be as simple as possible.
Next follows the same diagram, slightly modified, incorporating, from the doctor’s point of view, whether there is any moral hazard involved, and what the outcomes would be according to game theory, assuming simplified values of -1, 0, and 1.
Here is an attempt to make the above more readable on at least some browsers. Some colours had to be changed, and there is a slight distortion on the right, to get the required result. There is an unavoidable gap between the top and bottom parts, the text near the gap, on the left, is “If “No” chosen (no moral hazard)”.
The chart offers whiskey, it could be whatever ethanol-based drink was at hand. It can be seen that with rigorism, there is no winner. That the doctor loses is based on a possible sullied reputation, twinges of conscience for not having followed the Hippocratic Oath, or risk of assault by the victim or a friend. With laxism, the alcoholic wins 3 ways, he gets his drink, he gets his operation, and he incurs no debt. It is difficult the decide how well the doctor comes out in this case. If he had drunk too, he could end up a loser, with a dead patient, but if the patient survives, the moral hazard which clearly results goes against his interests. The safest decision clearly favours the surgeon. The alcoholic still gets the operation without incurring debt, but no moral hazard results, as he may think twice about trying such an event again, were he ever to be in a similar predicament. Equiprobabilism is almost the same, with slightly more hazard. Favours were dispensed to the dypsomaniac, the Hippocratic Oath was complied with. As it is shown above, the results with compensationism and probabilism or minusprobabilism are about the same. The only difference from laxism is that the medical man is still following an accepted system of rules. In that sense, by game theory, he has not lost. Of course, the loss to his income must be considered a moot point.
Other Considerations
Bernhard Häring hedges his position on the moral systems, by saying that in modern times, the differences between a moderate probabilism and probabiliorism are practically negligible (p. 249). If true, that would suggest even more hair-splitting in the categories given above. On the other hand, even within Catholicism, there can be found books on morality which do not even mention the systems here shown. [88] Denis Hawkins asks, “What help, meanwhile, is being offered by the professional moralists at the universities?” He later states, “Fundamental duties of justice and benevolence need no theological reference in order to be recognized.” [89] After that, because of their generalized nature, comments on the morality of tolerance, sex, war, and politics, come easily. Unfortunately, the reader is not given any help in deciding what to do in concrete situations.
This article has not examined the application of the so-called “fundamental option”, a bit outside of the existing framework of this article, yet touching upon it. This theological principle “may not be taught”, and with good reason – it would let the fundamentalist rigorists and the anarchists of laxism escape all responsibility for their actions. Further, whatever the moral system is, with the exclusion of laxism, and withinits dogmatic application, there is always a list of commands which are never to be disobeyed. This paragraph may contain apparent redundancies with what has already been stated under “Epikeia“, but the essential facts cannot be overemphasised.
The moral systems here presented, show that a diversity of behaviours can be possible even within a body representingone billion people. As a student of history, this author is curious to know, if any famous person ever undertook a controversial act after considering the shade of probability of non-compliance with a prescribed man-made or Divine Law, and how events could have been different, had a different criterion been used.
Historical Cases Illustrating Application of a Moral System
Conscience during the French Revolution
The French Revolution, as its offspring in other countries, is apt to be represented as mere manifestations of the middle-class or the poor against oppressive, reactionary, and obscurantist rule by a system based on monarchical and clerical dominance, fighting for the modernising of the economy, and the liberalising of society in general.
Once the truth of the saying, “France is the eldest daughter of the Church” [90] is accepted, some serious questions should arise as to how the country could have so violently reacted against its Christian heritage. By ignoring the most apologetic accounts in favour of one side or the other, it can be seen that some of the actors behaved in consonance with one or another of the systems delineated herein. While all the emphasis on teaching the French Revolution points to the teachings of the Enlightenment and theEncyclopédistes, it may come as a surprise that Jansenism had a role – according to the Catholic Encyclopedia, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy “was drawn up at the instigation of Jansenist lawyers”.[91] Thus one sees how a rigorous interpretation formed within the self-same Catholic body helped undermine it. Be that as it may, in the long run, Jansenism would hardly seem to be in harmony with the French spirit. The ethical choices that were forced upon the nation can be considered as regards the king, the clergy, the populace in general, and the nation in the long term.
King Louis XVI
The king of France felt obliged to sign the anti-Catholic legislation, in the interests of protecting the lives of his family and himself, even though Pope Pius VI urged him not to. On the other hand, he wanted to mitigate the effects of the new laws, and even Pius VI dithered, wanting to consult with some cardinals first. After a period of violence in France, he attempted to flee, supposedly the chief reason was his troubled conscience. [92]
The Clergy
The clergy, if correctly formed, would be the first to know how to correctly make use of the moral systems. It has already been mentioned that some were under Jansenist influence. Here, may be mentioned Jansenists concepts of rejection of kingship and absolutism, and the feeling by one of their theologians, Camus, that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was “in perfect harmony with the New Testament and the councils of the fourth century.” [93] Later, “.. new bishops were required to swear loyalty to the State in far stronger terms than to any religious doctrine.” [94]
A clear antecedent for not doing so is the case of Thomas More, who would not swear to the oath required by the Act of Succession during the reign of Henry VIII of England. Some of the French clergy did go along with the new legislation of whatever kind, the bishop Talleyrand being the most famous of these. Excommunicated in 1791, but later released (about the time of the coup d’etat of Brumaire), and four hours before his death, he signed ” [a] solemn declaration in which he openly disavowed [his errors].” [95] Some of the clergy had taken the oath, based on the fact that the Pope had not yet declared against it. [96]
The Populace
A portion of the populace remained loyal to the clergy which did not side with the revolution. This may be due to the inherent conservatism of the peasantry, and identification with a clergy which had budded from their own soil, as opposed to the likes of Talleyrand, who had achieved high office through aristocratic connections. A similar phenomenon was to be played out during the Mexican Revolution, in which theCristerosdefied government of President Plutarco Elías Calles.
Other Examples
The difficulties which Alphonsus Liguori encountered have already been mentioned. A sad case is that of anti-Semitism. Peter Pulzer points out that the various levels of clerics in Austria around 1900 were all of a different mind. The popular and anti-Semitic Christian-Socialist movement, was viewed with dislike by the Conservative hierarchy, for its appeal to base instincts, which was not to say that the ecclesiastical authorities were exactly kindly-disposed to the Jews of the country. Nevertheless, the bishops complained to Rome, where theOsservatoresometimes complained of excesses, but both Leo XIII and the Vatican Secretary of State are reported to have been in disagreement with the Viennese Church authorities, feeling that the Christian-Socialists, through contact with the lower clergy, were doing excellent work in evangelizing the people anew. A publication which a bishop had banned in the seminaries, carried a Papal blessing.[97]
A better example, but not free of clerical influence, is that of Ludwig Freiherr von Leonrod. He was aware of General Claus von Stauffenberg’s plan to assassinate Hitler, but had some moral reservations, between his duty to fulfill his oath to the “Fatherland”, and that of obeying a percieved moral imperative, – that of ridding his country of a tyrant. He presented the case to his confessor, Father Wehrle. “Es gibt keine allgemein gültige Antwort. Dem Einzelnen ist die Freiheit der Gewissensentscheidung auferlegt und damit die furchtbare Last dieser Freiheit.“[98] (There is no generally valid answer. The individual is left with his freedom to form his conscience, and thus the terrible burden of freedom.)
Stauffenberg, Leonrod, and Father Wehrle paid with their lives for their decision to go ahead with the assassination plan. [99]
Another war-time event concerns Emmanuel Mounier, founder and director of the magazine Esprit. Apparently, he was often denounced to the ecclesiastical authorities, where his enemies were unsuccessful in silencing him. One time, jailed by the Pétainistes, he asked for the services of the jail chaplain. The latter refused the prisoner, “for having disobeyed the legal authority (por haber desobedecido el poder legal).”[100]
On a more up-to-date note, here is a link to a nuanced metaphor , about individuals such as Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, caught in a conflict between patriotism to a country or loyalty to a religious faith. However, the latter officer can in no way be compared to von Leonrod – the idea of paying with one’s life after making as many others as possible lose theirs, is a position which none of the sources quoted in this article would ever condone. Some Muslims would cite Surah 5, Verse 32 to show that they too, believe that the taking of life is not considered acceptable – unless it be for murder, or spreading “mischief in the land”.[101] A similar expression is found in the Talmud, inMishnah Sanhedrin4.5 [in Hebrew]: “… man was created singly, to teach that he who destroys one soul of a human being, the Scripture considers him as if he should destroy a whole world..” This is made clearer in the comments to that text [in English].[102]
© Paul Karl Moeller Sept. 19, 2009 – Feb. 15, 2010
Addendum: On an Improvement of the Graphical Presentation of Moral Systems
Images 2 and 3 compared
Since the apparently preferable probabiliorism (yellow) and equiprobabilism (orange) are both towards the rigorist side of the ten choices previously presented, it may be argued either that they are in effect too severe, or that a linear scale is wrong. It should be more like the graph of sines from zero to ninety degrees, where zero is rigorism. By the time one gets to 30 degrees (let that be equiprobabilism), half the possible height of the scale has already been reached, the sines up to that point having increased rapidly in value, and hence a danger is shown in taking the more benevolent line of thinking – one becomes a risk-taker, if not outright bold in relationship to the law. [103] As, in fact, divisions between the various moral systems are not so clear cut, Image 3 attempts to correct the above, by showing blurring between the various systems. |
Images and Concept by Paul Karl Moeller
A Further Dimension to the Two-Dimensional “Probable Opinion Usage System”
A two-dimensional representation of the problem has its validity, and indeed, as it has been given, represents the major component of this present work’s purpose. Let not any moral or ethical system be ignored, for simplicity, four types are proposed:
First type: Moral code of the primitive man – totenism – pre-religious conscience. Second type: Natural Law – Pre-judaeo-christian ethics Third type: Judaeo-Christian ethics (referring to most of Europe and America.) or similar. Fourth Level: Post-[judaeo]-christian ethics. It may be valid to consider this level as another way of understanding situation ethics.
An attempt could be made to link these four types to the 9 moral systems, in order to get a three-dimensional image of a formed conscience. The first type would fit in with the utmost difficulty. Adam and Eve would seem superior to it. The second type, for example, was propounded by Plato in Greece, and Seneca for the Roman world. It may be applicable to some humanists. The third type, possibly should simply be called religious ethics. The argument is that religion calls one to greater effort than mere human-centred ethics, which could be shattered with the first let-down by a friend. While that danger also exists in the “If-God-is-All-Good-then-why-did-He-create-evil?” school of thought, the very question, outside of philosophy, suggests an incompletely formed, or momentarily befuddled believer. The fourth level, in the context of Image 3, would be a black sine wave intersecting, at a right angle, the existing black area found between 80 and 90 degrees. Part of it might, in a 3-D representation, drop rapidly around the y-axis at 90°, disappearing by or before reaching 50°.
Select Bibliography
…. Manual de los Confesores. Vol. I. Madrid: J. Gaume, 1844.
Alford, C. Fred. What Evil Means to Us. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Archbishopric of Munich – FreisingWebsite. “Gewissensnot und Eidestreue“. August 2004. <http://www.erzbistum-muenchen.de/EMF145/EMF014498.asp>. Accessed 20091021.
Attwater, Donald. “Alphonsus Liguori”. The Avenel Dictionary of Saints, New York: Avenel Books, 1979.
Barrau, Th. H. Livre de Morale Pratique Ou Choix De Péceptes Et De Beaux Exemples. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1912.
Ben Yaakov, Avraham. Know Your Bible. “I Kings Chapter 3”. <http://www.barmitzva.org/Bible/I%20Kings%203-4.htm>. Accessed 20091003.
Bujanda, Jesús. Casos de Consiencia. Segunda edición, puesta al día por Estanislao Olivares. Madrid: Razón y Fe, 1963.
Bujanda, Jesús. Teología moral para los fieles. Madrid: Razón y Fe, 1956.
Catholic Encyclopedia. (various articles). New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907-14.
Conway, Msgr. J. D. Modern Moral Problems. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers. 1964.
D’Arcy, Eric. Conscience and its Right to Freedom. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.
Denziger-Schönmetzer. Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, editio xxxvi, Herder, Barcelona, 1976.
Engels, Friedrich. Herrn Eugen Dühring’s Umwälzung der Wissenschaft. Online text at the http://www.mlwerke.de website, as edited 30.08.1999. <http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me20/me20_032.htm>.
Farrell, Walter. Sin. New York: Canterbury Books, Sheed and Ward. 1938[?].
Febvre, Lucien. Martin Luther: Religion als Schicksal. Translated from the French by Barbara Peymann. Franfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1976.
García D. Figar, Antonio. La Moralidad en Quiebra. Madrid: Ediciones FAX. 1936.
Ferreres, Juan B. Compendia de Teología Moral, I. Barcelona: Eugenio Subirana, 1923.
Häring, Bernhard. Ley de Cristo, I, Barcelona: Herder, 1970.
Hawkins, Denis J. B. Christian Ethics. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963.
Herring, Francis W. “What Has Reason to Do with Morality”. The Journal of Philosophy 50 (1953): 688-698.
Hertling, Ludovico. Curso Breve de Teología Ascetica. Translated (into Spanish) from the Latin by Ignacio Granero. Buenos Aires: Grupo de Editoriales Católicos, 1947.
Hortelano, A. Moral responsable: Conciencia moral cristiana. Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme. 1971.
Huerga, Álvaro. Savonarola: Reformador y profeta. Madrid: B.A.C., 1978.
Hünermann, Wilhelm. Historia del reino de Dios, Tomo III. Quoted in“Jurar o no jurar”. Cristo Hoy. (S. M. de Tucumán, Argentina). 9-15 octubre de 2007.
Jewish Encyclopedia. [on-line edition]. (Articles by Gotthard Deutsch,et. al.)
Kramarz, Joachim. Claus Graf Stauffenberg: Der Mann des Widerstandes gegen Hitler. München: Wilhelm Heine, 1965.
Lepp, Ignace. Escándalo y Consuelo. Translated by Delfin Leocadio Garasa. Buenos Aires: Carlos Lohlé, 1961.
Liguori, Alphonsus. Theología Moralis I. Edited by Mich. Heilig. Mechlinle (i.e.Mechlin): P. J. Hanicq, 1854. [http://books.google.com/books?id=ICsPAAAAQAAJ&oe=UTF-8].
Marquez, P. Gabino, S. J. Filosofia Moral II. 5th edition. Madrid: Biblioteca “Fomento Social”, Escelicer, 1943.
Montánchez, Jesús.Teología Moral. Buenos Aires: Poblet, 1947.
“Situation Ethics” in Our Sunday Visitor’s Catholic Encyclopedia. Edited by Peter M. J. Stravinskas, Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing, 1998. [Available on-line].
Pulzer, Peter G. J. The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. New York: Wiley, 1964.
Reuter, J. Neo-Confessarius, editio novo: Aug. Lehmkuhl. Freiburg: Herder, 1919.
Rossi, Giovanni, ed. Cien Problemas de Conciencia. Translated by Juan Cortés del Pino. Buenos Aires: Mundo Moderno, 1962.
Royo Marín, Antonio. Teología Moral Para Seglares, I, Madrid: B.A.C.,1979.
Scheffler, Israel. “Anti-Naturalist Restriction in Ethics. The Journal of Philosophy 50 (1953): 457-466.
Seneca, Lucio Anneo.Tratados Morales, I. (Latin), edited and translated (into Spanish) by José M. Gallegos. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 1944.
Slater, Thomas. A Manual of Moral Theology for English-Speaking Countries,I. London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1925. [Available on-line].
Sprott, W. J. H. Human Groups. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958.
Stone, Brian. Introduction to Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, by Anonymous, trans. Brian Stone. Harmondsworth: Penguin; 1983.
Vann, Gerald. Morals and Man. London: Fontana Books., 1960.
Viner, Jacob. First page of “Appendix: Protestant Casuistics”.History of Political Economy1978 10(1):191-192. Duke University Press Web Page. <http://hope.dukejournals.org/cgi/pdf_extract/10/1/191>. Acc: 091003.
Vittrant, Jean-Benoît. Théologie Morale, dix-neuvième édition. Paris: Beauchesne, 1944
West, Morris, and Francis, Robert. Scandal in the Assembly: A Bill of Complaints and a Proposal for Reform on the Matrimonial Laws and Tribunals of the Roman Catholic Church. London: Pan, 1970.
Footnotes
1. This has been further subdivided into: Probable Opinion Usage Systems, «Les systèmes relatifs à l’usage des opinions probables»: Jean-Benoît Vittrant. Théologie Morale, dix-neuvième édition. (Paris: Beauchesne, 1944), 52.
2. On January 9, 2010, the author’s preferred search engine gave 2,090,000 results for “game theory”, 318,000 for “moral theology”, and 6,420 for “‘moral theology’ game theory”, of which only 736 were considered unique, and of the first three pages returned by the engine, about half were off-topic.
3. W. J. H. Sprott. Human Groups. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958. 14.
4. ibid., p. 12.
5. adapted, ibid., p. 9, 16, 20.
6. ibid., 147.
7. ibid., 21.
8. I Kings 3: 15-28. (16-26 in Douay-Rheims version.) In fact, two different interpretations about how the lying woman was found out have been gleaned from the web, while three interpretations are given for the exact nature of these women. Cf. Avraham ben Yaakov, Know Your Bible, “I Kings Chapter 3”. <http://www.barmitzva.org/Bible/I%20Kings%203-4.htm>. Accessed 091003.
9. R. W. Cooper. The Nuremberg Trial. (London: Penguin, 1947). 53.
10. Cf. Friedrich Engels. Herrn Eugen Dühring’s Umwälzung der Wissenschaft [i.e., Anti-Dühring], Part I, ch. ix.”Wenn wir nun aber sehn, daß die drei Klassen der modernen Gesellschaft, die Feudalaristokratie, die Bourgeoisie und das Proletariat jede ihre besondre Moral haben, so können wir daraus nur den Schluß ziehn, daß die Menschen, bewußt oder unbewußt, ihre sittlichen Anschauungen in letzter Instanz aus den praktischen Verhältnissen schöpfen, in denen ihre Klassenlage begründet ist – aus den ökonomischen Verhältnissen, in denen sie produzieren und austauschen.” This extract was from http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me20/me20_032.htm. Acc: 090901.]
11. “Interpretatio legis est genuina eius explicatio iuxta mentem legislatoris.” Juan B. Ferreres. Compendio de Teología Moral, I. (Eugenio Subirana: Barcelona, 1923), p. 121. (In the interpretation of a law, the genuine explanation is that which reflects the mind of the legislator. – PKM. This principle is found in the civil law of some countries.)
12. Gerald Vann. Morals and Man. (London: Collins Fontana Books, 1960). 39.
13. This statement, a pure adaptation by the present author, is meant to succinctly state the position held in Judaism, Mohammedanism and Christian religions in general. It is asked that it be taken as a given, proof is outside of the lenght of this article as a web page.
14. Adapted from Mark 12:30,31, and the Augustine of Hippo quote.
15. Thomas Slater. “Synderesis”. Catholic Encylopedia. (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). New Advent version: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06166a.htm>. Accessed 091010. Fr. Slater, in spite of the title of the article, claims “synteresis” to be the more correct term.
16. Eric D’Arcy. Conscience and its Right to Freedom. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961). A book with too much to be condensed into the current article, more academic than practical, see, for example, the complexities regarding synderesis, cf the chapter “Conscience in the Scholastics”, pp. 20-48.
17. To this one could create the challenge that, Adam and Eve, could not even have had synderesis if they had not previously eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, else, what good and evil were they to avoid?
18. Compare this example: By definition, neither moral, nor most positive laws, would ascribe guilt to the individual about whom the author had this anecdote: At the age of 4 or 5, at the butcher’s, a youngster looked about carefully, and grabbed a roll of cellophane-wrapped coloured mints. These were taken home. Later, somehow, suspecting that the product could be poisonous, the little thief crushed the candies on the sidewalk in front of his home. This story raises some questions, assuming that the individual neither had done anything like this ever before, nor after: where did [s]he get the idea that the act to be perpetrated had to be done without witnesses; was synderesis or conscience at work; and whence came the insight that the candy could kill – a sort of prescient feeling of potential punishment from on high?
19. Author’s translation from: Jesús Montánchez. Teología Moral. (Buenos Aires: Poblet, 1947), 1.
20. Thomas Slater. A Manual of Moral Theology for English-Speaking Countries, I. (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1925). 3. It is supposed that by “organs” the limbs, etc., are meant to be included. A more precise definition of “commanded acts” is wanting, let the heartbeat be considered as an example.
21. Ibid., 5. The author includes a purely theological argument: “For human acts connote freedom, …, while an act may be voluntary and yet not free. … However, all voluntary acts of man are in this life free, and so, for the purposes of moral theology, human acts and voluntary acts are interchangeable terms.” The last part of that sentence may be considered as a part of the definition.
22.Ibid., 6. As this kind of example is becoming less meaningful, the reader is remitted to Shakespeare’s The Tempest, where the first pages present such a situation.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 8-9.
25. ibid., 11-13.
26. ibid.
27. Ibid., 16-17. This observation would seem to be valid only in the case of a just war. However, the present writer’s take is that theologians of the 1950s or thereabouts did not want to allow the citizen to question the State. – PKM.
28. Ibid., 18. An example of the obscure definitions that put distance between churchmen and the rest of society.
29. C. Fred Alford. What Evil Means to Us. (Itaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 63-4.
30. “… St. Thomas .. suggest[s] that the “good” gives pleasure and is attractive for this reason.” Monica Lawlor, Personal Responsibility. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963, 42.
31. Antonio García D. Figar, O.P. “El fracaso de la Moral Racionalista: los Sistemas.” La Moralidad en Quiebra. (Madrid: Ediciones FAX, 1936). pp. 18-24.
32. n Spanish, “moral biológica“. ibid. p. 20.
33. ‘ … “basta sólo con extraer de nosotros la idea de bondad y elevarlo sobre las otras ideas“‘. ibid., p. 21.
34. 100. ibid., 21-22.
35. ibid., 22.
36. ibid., 22.
37. Fr. Stephen F. Torraco, “Probabilism”, on EWTN Faith page, 2009.
38. Jansen is described by the Catholic Encyclopedia as both “daring” and “orthodox”, but after his death, 5 propositions were condemned.
39. Year is that of the first volume of his Moral Theology.
40. Manual de los Confesores, Vol. I, title page illustration at top of this article.
41. On page 52, Vittrant, op. cit., distinguishes between Rigorism and Tutiorism, referring to the first of these as condemned, but his definition of the second hardly distinguishes it from the former, hence it has been put in the second column.
42. Teología moral para los fieles, gives a comment similar to that in the preceding, but it says Tutiorism should rather be called rigorism. For simplicity, these are again being considered as Rigorism and Mitigated Rigorism.
43. Msgr. J. D. Conway. Modern Moral Problems. (Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1964.) He tries very hard to strike a balance. A note on the former Index of Prohibited Books, then still in force: “Anyone who has a good sound reason for reading forbidden books, and is qualified to handle them, can easily get permission. – p. 25. The Legion of Decency, which rated movies at the time, is described as a pressure group without any connection to the authority of the Church in whose name is supposedly spoke. – p. 26. A difficulty in using the correct approach is found in the article on suicide, no action suggesting that it is condoned, yet “kindness and sympathy” for the bereaved. – p. 57.
44. Häring, op. cit., 241, shows a position such as Bujanda’s. The original Law of Christ was an orthodox theologian, a 1978 rework, Free and Faithful in Christ, reveal a modern one. He was investigated by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Cf. <http://www.alfonsiana.edu/English/istituto/memoriam/en_haring.htm>. (Acc: 091107).
45. Antonio Hortelano’s writing style seems to be an effort to defend himself against any charge of heterodoxy. He constantly seems to be taking contradictory positions, but apparently takes that of fellow Redemptorist, Fr. Häring, while trying to portray his position as that of a Thomist. His style may be explained, in part, by his having such a personality that he was – in prudence, let it be said, supposedly – a spy for the Vatican, for Mossad, an arrestee of the KGB, and a person under watch by the CIA: José Manuel Vidal, “Las confesiones del cura espía del Vaticano”. El Mundo. 02/08/2009. <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/08/01/espana/1249162588.html>. Accessed 091219.
46. Cf. the importance of making sure that the gas has been turned off in a home, as compared to checking to see if the door is locked in a low crime area, and to making sure that a pet has enough food in the event of a slight delay in getting home.
47. Perhaps if the present author’s knowledge of Latin were better, and if the necessary books were available, this type of classification could be found. As it is, only the first two paragraphs of this section with the corollaries are to be found in some books, the rest has been formulated after several years of consideration.
48. Delany, Joseph. “Prudence.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911). <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12517b.htm>. Acc: 100106.
49. (To act without first reflecting is to go on a trip without having made preparations. Do not undertake anything without first having thought it over, but once you have made your decision, carry it out energetically. – P.K.M.) Moralistes anciens, cited in: Th. H. Barrau. “§ X. Prudence, Habilité”. Livre de Morale Pratique Ou Choix De Préceptes Et De Beaux Exemples. (Paris: Hachette, 1912).
50. Brian Stone, Introduction to Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, by anonymous, trans. by Brian Stone. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). 19-20.
51. Denziger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, editio xxxvi, Barcelona: Herder, 1976J), §2303 [ex 1293] [The following Jansenist opinion was condemned by the Holy Office December 7, 1670]: Non licet sequi opinionem (probabilem) vel inter probabiles probabilissimam, (i.e. It is not lawful to follow either a probable opinion, or, among various probable ones, the most probable. – P.K.M.)
52. Cf. Álvaro Huerga, Savonarola: Reformador y profeta, (Madrid, BAC, 1978), xiv; where his rigorism is mentioned; and 115: “una diatriba inmisericorde contra la clerecía y la jerarquía, contra los tibios y los descontentos: [an unmerciful diatribe against the clergy, the hierarchy, those neither hot nor cold, and the discontented – PKM]. The author concludes, though, the Savonarola was not a heretic (p. 248), though disobedient (p. 249.)
53. For a psychological analysis of Luther, cf. Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther.
54. Ludovico Hertling, Curso Breve de la Teologia Ascética, (Buenos Aires: Grupo de Editoriales Católicos, 1947), §187. However, the quote, perhaps, was meant to be limited to training for ascetic perfection.
55. ibid., §297.
56. Gotthard Deutsch ,” AARON ABBA HA-LEVI BEN JOHANAN”, Jewish Encyclopedia.
57. Antonio Royo Marín, Teología Moral Para Seglares, I, (Madrid: B.A.C., 1979), 149, §180, 1.
58. ibid., §180, 2. Bernhard Häring, Ley de Cristo, I, (Barcelona: Herder, 1970), 245, ignores this subclassification, and Royo Marín, 151, §183 acknowledges that a most probable opinion is probably impossible to arrive at, and hence this moderate rigorism has been discarded by most moralists.
59. Royo Marín, 151, §185.
60. P. Gabino Marquez, S. J. Filosofia Moral II, 5a ed. (Madrid: Biblioteca “Fomento Social” Escelicer , 1943), 195. Translation of text by P.K.M.
61. Häring, 246, points out that this is the position of St. Alphonsus Liguori, patron of confessors and moralists. This role model for Catholic confessors therefore is more moderate than that of those upon whom Royo Marín cites as defining the best position. Häring does point out that the praise of Ligouri is not a condemnation of probabiliorism [p. 249]. Cf. Ferreres, op. cit., who seems to associate probabiliorism with rigorism, and cites Liguori declaring himself an equiprobabilist, 89. Slater puts Liguori in the probabilist school, suggesting that any later declaration was to protect his congregation, and did not imply a change of principle: p. 41.
62. Donald Attwater, The Avenel Dictionary of Saints, ( New York: Avenel Books, 1979), p 41. The same article is available under “Alphonsus Liguori” in The Penguin Dictionary of Saints, Penguin being the previous publisher of the Avenel book.
63. Alphonsus Liguori. Theologia Moralis I. Edited by Mich. Heilig. P. J. Hanicq, Mechlinle (i.e. Mechlin), 1854. [http://books.google.com/books?id=ICsPAAAAQAAJ&oe=UTF-8]. Pp. 90, 97, respectively. “Perditissimi” could be relatively neutral, as in “most lost” or something as strong as “most infamous”. The very use of the intensifier “most” is “exceedingly” curious.
64. Royo Marín, 152, §186.
65. This example, if not common, was read in a book on morals published in the 1970s by OSV Press. The author was a Ukrainian-Canadian priest, of the province of Manitoba, and the book was written for ordinary people. Further details not available.
66. Slater, 6-7.
67. ibid., 7.
68. Häring, 245-6. Quote on page 245.
69. Royo Marín, 153, §187, 2a.
70. Slater, 42. His example has been modified a bit, by incorporating the idea of the lien. Some noteworthy references to Anglican Probabilism: The discovery of islands: essays in British history – Google Books Result, John Greville Agard Pocock; Lady Chatterley and the Monk: Anglican Radicals and the Lady Chatterley Trial of 1960, by Mark Roodhouse (“doctrine of probabilism, a system of casuistry advocated by most contemporary Anglican theologians”); The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-century Philosophy – Google Books Result, by Daniel Garber and Mark Ayers; (“the Anglican probabilist tradition”). Google search conducted 010206.
71. Denziger-Schönmetzer, 458, §2103(ex 1153). [This statement was condemned]: Generatim, dum probabilitate sive intrinseca sive extrinseca quantumvis tenui, modo a probabilitatis finibus non exeatur, confisi aliquid agimus, semper prudenter agimus, (i.e., “Generally speaking, in doing something while trusting in its intrinsic or extrinsic probability [of being correct] – however slight – one does not step outside of the bounds of probability.” – P.K.M.)
72. Engels, op. cit.. [Not exactly the word “laxism”, but “lax morality”, which this author holds to be the same]: “… die christlich-feudale [Moral], aus frühern glaubten Zeiten überkommne, die sich wesentlich wieder in eine katholische und protestantische teilt, wobei wieder Unterabteilungen von der jesuitisch-katholischen und orthodox-protestantischen bis zur lax-aufgeklärten Moral nicht fehlen” (i.e. “… the feudal Christian (morality) transmitted from earlier times, which was essentially divided into Catholic and Protestant, with the presence of subdivisions into Jesuit-Catholic, Orthodox-Protestant, and enlightened lax moralities.”, – P.K.M.
73. Morris West and Robert Francis. Scandal in the Assembly: A Bill of Complaints and a Proposal for Reform on the Matrimonial Laws and Tribunals of the Roman Catholic Church. (London: PAN Books, 1970). 150.
74. ibid., 170.
75. “Situation Ethics” in Our Sunday Visitor’s Catholic Encyclopedia, Peter M. J. Stravinskas, editor. (Our Sunday Visitor Publishing, Huntington, Indiana, 1998). On-line source <http://books.google.com/books?id=vJ78Vd4O9d4C&printsec=frontcover&output=html>. Accessed 090926.
76. San Alberto Magno,. Opera omnia, Paris, 1834, 7, 1, 5; Ethicorum, 384-385. Quoted in A. Hortelano. Moral responsable: Conciencia moral cristiana. (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1971), 274.
77. Subdued translation of: “Epiqueya es una interpretación benigna, pero justa, de la ley, por la cual se juzga que la ley no comprende algún caso particular, aunque no esté exceptuado por las palabras de la ley, por creerse fundadamente que el legislador, o no lo previó, o no quiso comprenderlo; así, p. ej., si la ley prohibe el traer armas de noche, puedo llevarlas si he de salir y encontrarme con mi enemigo, que me busca para darme muerte.”Ferreres, 123.
78. “U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff – Class II Special Controls Guidance Document: Implantable Radiofrequency Transponder System for Patient Identification and Health Information”, December 10, 2004 – updated 06/18/2009, just before the 2nd section, considers “The Least Burdensome Approach” and suggests that parties might have even an less onerous one (since the full address is probably not readabe on screeen, a link has been provided: <www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm072141.htm>.Acc: 010115. Much clearer in asking for efficiency was this document, in Portuguese: “Concurso Público. Nível Superior e Médio. DH13. Administrador – Processo Gestão de Recursos Humanos. Caderno 2 Gabarito 2“. P. 13, §52 (B), (C). TRENSURB. (Porto Alegre, February 2010). This author found the same on a photocopied half-page, undated, where the above point B was E, and C was A. <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/28482074/DH13-ADMINISTRADOR-%E2%80%93-PROCESSO-GESTO-DE-RECURSOS-HUMANOS>. Acc: 20120703.
79. Hortelano mentions casuistry at least 6 times, 4 times negatively, twice with attenuated remarks, such as this (translation): “The complicated art of making licit that which is not”, p. 22; or “moral pathology”, p. 181 (citing P. Prümmer, Manuale Theologie Moralis, I, prologus, n. 9). Admittedly, this latter view, but taken positively, is held by Slater, more correctly referring to books on moral theology as such – Preface to First Edition, v., comparing them to the texts used by doctors and lawyers. A work of casuistry not quite conforming with the definition given is: Giovanni Rossi, ed. Cien Problemas de Conciencia. Buenos Aires: Mundo Moderno, 1962. It contains articles by various authors, not necessarily all following the same school of thought. Among the varied issues it addresses are legal trials, beauty contests, obedience to the state’s laws, yoga, pinball, quack doctors, and questions of race.
80. The reference for the above material is: Jacob Viner: “Appendix: Protestant Casuistics History of Political Economy 10(1)”: 191-192 (1978). <http://hope.dukejournals.org/cgi/pdf_extract/10/1/191>. Acc: 091003. A reference to Anglicanism: INGENIOUS PIETY: ANGLICAN CASUISTRY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, by C. Slights. ; “Ductor Dubitantium (1660), a classic of Anglican casuistry“, under the heading “A CASE FOR CASUISTRY IN THE CHURCH”, by Nigel Biggart. Google search conducted 010206.
81. Similar, if not the same, prescriptions, still exist. Sometimes euphemisms are used, which may confuse the issue. One web site allows 4 fingers below the collar-bone as an acceptable neck-line: “Modesty Guidelines”. <www.purefashion.com/modesty>. Accessed 091017. A traditionalist site, not responding to the Vatican, considers “low cut neck lines” as immodest”: Bishop Mark A. Pivarunas, CMRI. “Modesty in Dress”. CMRI website. <www.cmri.org/96prog6.html>. Accessed 091013. Some sites admit what others do not. Antonio García D: Figar, O.P., La Moralidad en Quiebra, (Madrid: Ediciones FAX, 1936), allows for a breadth of 3 fingers under the neck, no nude arms for married women, only lower arm revealed for single women, hem halfway up to knee for young girls, not for mature women. (pp 110, 111). This rigor can be traced from Tertullian’s “On Modesty” to a 1956 papal declaration, http://www.catholicmodesty.com/Popesonmodesty.html.
82. The author does not declare himself competent to comment on the veracity of this argument, only that it exists.
83. This was the result of a conversation on January 6, 2010, originally dealing with the disputable way of removing the head of a central bank in this author’s host country.
84. See: “Terms Beginning with M”. The Economist Newspaper Limited Webpage. 2010. <www.economist.com/RESEARCH/ECONOMICS/alphabetic.cfm?letter=M>. Acc: 100108.
85. See the description at: Jonathan Wallace. “We Are All Prisoners”. The Ethical Spectator 1995. <http://www.spectacle.org/995/pd.html>. Acc: 100108.
86. Wallace, op. cit. “An Ethic Based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma”, <www.spectacle.org/995/ethic.html>. Acc: 100108.
87. See, for example, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=100209.
88. Cf. Denis J. B. Hawkins, Christian Ethics, ( New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963).
89. Ibid., 14, 15.
90. Cf. Luke Coppen, “Behind Enemy Lines”, Editor’s Notes, Catholic Herald, 12 September . 2008, <http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/articles/editorial/e0000278.shtml>; or Pope Leo XIII, Nobilissima Gallorum Gens: On the Religious Question in France, 8 February 1884, cited by Kevin Knight in New Advent, 2007: <http://www.newadvent.org/library/docs_le13ng.htm>. Both resources accessed 091010. Accessed 091010.
91. Georges Goyau. “France”. (subheading: “History to the Third Republic”). Catholic Encylopedia. (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). New Advent version: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06166a.htm>. Accessed 091010.
92. Goyau. “French Revolution”. (subheading: “Civil constitution of the clergy”). Catholic Encylclopedia, op. cit. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13009a.htm>. Acc: 091009. Accessed 091010.
93. Regarding the Jansenist aspect, cf. “France History – French Revolution Civil Constitution of the Clergy” (using material from Wikipedia, “Civil Constitution of the Clergy”), 2009. Bonjour La France Website. <http://www.bonjourlafrance.com/france-facts/france-history/french-revolution-civil-constitution-of-the-clergy.htm>. Acc: 091009. Reference [6] in the quote refers to <http://www.dabar.org/Religion/RED/R-Words/Redrevolution.htm>.
94. ibid., Bonjour La France Website.
95. For Talleyrand: Gustave Gautherot. “Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord”. Catholic Encyclopedia, op. cit. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14434b.htm>. Acc: 091010.
96. Wilhelm Hünermann. Historia del reino de Dios, Tomo III. [Adaptation quoted in] “Jurar o no jurar“, Cristo Hoy (S. M. de Tucumán, Argentina), 9 – 15 octubre de 2007, p. 16.
97. Peter G. J. Pulzer. The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. (New York, Wiley, 1964). 181-2.
98. Erzbistums München und Freising webpage. “Gewissensnot und Eidestreue“. August 2004. <http://www.erzbistum-muenchen.de/EMF145/EMF014498.asp>. Accessed 21 September 2009. Translation of text by P.K.M.
99. As the war went on, Stauffenberg became more religious. Leonrod felt the necessity, at first, of keeping his oath, but the former stated, “in einer derartigen Notlage … auch ein an und für sich als heilig anzusehender Eide nicht mehr gültig sei“, i.e. in a situation such as the one they found themselves in, a vow which of itself was seen as holy, was no longer valid. Joachim Kramarz. Claus Graf Stauffenberg: Der Mann des Widerstandes gegen Hitler.(München: Heyne, 1965), 182.
100. Ignace Lepp. Escándalo y Consuelo. Translated by Delfin Leocadio Garasa. (Buenos Aires: Carlos Lohlé, 1961). 33.
101. Peter Standring. “Koran a Book of Peace, Not War, Scholars Say”. National Geographic News web site. Thursday, October 28, 2010. <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/09/0925_TVkoran_2.html>. Acc.: 20120703.
102. In Hebrew, with comment: Rabbi Carl Kinbar. “Mishnah Sanhedrin 4.5”.OCTOBER 9, 2010. New School for Jewish Studies Web site.<http://nsfjs.org/midrashetc/2010/10/9/mishnah-sanhedrin-45.html>. Commented, in English: “Tractate Sanhedrin, Chapter IV.” Jewish Virtual Library Web site. 2012. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Talmud/sanhedrin4.html>. Both accessed 20120703.
103. Hortelano, op. cit., credits Cartesianism with influencing the moral systems (p. 47), As Descartes also influenced mathematical graphing, there is a scientific unity to all of this.
104. Due to the difficulty in creating exactly what the author has in mind, and in dealing with 3-D objects, this image is a compromise. A perfect sphere would not seem to adequately express the complexity of moral systems.